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The international shipping industry is distin-
guished from most other transport and many
other service industries by the degree to which
it has survived four fifths of the 20th century
without any significant state intervention on the
one hand, and without any oligopolistic concen-
tration of ownership o the other. Shipping
companies are thus more exposed to genuine, as
against managed, market forces than most other
companies trading internationally, and more liable
to experience exaggerated peaks of profitability
and similar troughs of loss, the past five years
being one of the best ever examples of the latter.
Liner Conferences exist, of course, but they have
not all been effective in stabilising profits.
Shipping is, in consequence, the most unlikely
candidate for intergovermnental standards of
operating practice, and will only bow down to
them if enough governments act in detailed
concert to outweigh the forces of supply and
demand.
The Liner Code In Practice
The underlying principle of the 1974 UNCTAD
Code of Liner Conduct is that each country using
ocean-going shipping is entitled to carry an equal
per centage of its seaborne trade in ships under its
own flag. UNCTAD has chosen shipping because
it believes it to be easier to control this service
by market-sharing than it would be to make, say,
each country with the capacity grow 40 per cent
of its own wheat or dig 40 per cent of its own
coal consumption. Western shipowners, who at
present carry over 80 per cent of 120 developing
countries' seaborne trade, agree that ships are
easier to move about the world than coal mines
and farmland, but claim that this is as far as it
goes; creating a right under law to carry cargo
does not bequeath upon a country the ability to
carry such cargo any more cheaply than
foreigners could. Indeed the owners claim that
the Code will make it considerably more
expensive. And owners registered in countries
whose carrying capacity is not used extensively on
domestic trade, such as Norway with 8 per cent,
Greece with 5 per cent and Liberia with 1 per
centi.e. the leading cross-traders--see great
disadvantage to themselves in multilaterally
enforced cargo sharing.
The logic of the Code is somewhat simpler than
its practicability: 40 per cent of each and every
type of liner cargo is to be carried by ships from
the exporting country, 40 per cent by ships from
the importing country, and just the remaining 20
per cent by the cross-traders. Since anything
between 50 and 100 per cent of some 120
countries' cargoes is at present carried by the
ships of 12 countries, it will be seen that a world-
wide redistribution of the trade is as much a
freight forwarder's nightmare as it undoubtedly
must be a UN bureaucrat's dream. But the
principle is the thing in international negotiations
of this kind.
The key requirement for the Code to come into
force was for the countries ratifying it to account
for at least 25 per cent of world liner tonnage.
This made it effectively impossible for the 120
developing countries to activate it on their own,
and essential for at least some of the Western
nations to ratify it. There was a tremendous
wrangle between the eight shipowning countries
of the EEC over ratification, with West Germany
carrying way below 40 per cent of its liner
tradearguing in favour, and Britainwith the
capacity to carry 150 per cent of its liner trade-.-
arguing against. The compromise that finally
allowed the EEC members to agree among them-
selves, and then to establish a common line with
that other major shipowning country, Japan, was
ingeniously simple and probably the one that
Third World shipping ministries were really
after, though they would not care to admit as
much.
The compromise is as follows: the 24 countries
of the OECD will not operate the 40:40: 20 rule
in shipping between themselves, but will accept
it in trade between each of them and all trading
partners from the Third World. Thus the EEC
would not demand 40 per cent of its imports in
its own ships from its 17 industrialised colleagues,
and would not expect them to do so either.
Further, no EEC member country would hang
on to its 40 per cent of trade with any Third
World state if the line of another EEC member
could successfully bid for the business. The
format responses to this from the world's biggest
user of shipping, the USA, anl the world's
biggest supplier and second biggest user, Japan,
are expected during 1980; they are expected to
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dovetail more or less with the EEC proposals,
allowing for the concept of 'fairness'.
This proviso of a 'fair market' is an interesting
one to have come out of the backwaters and into
the main stream of international shipping. Is it
linked to some concept of divine right or to what
a country should command as a function of its
carrying capacity? The Western consensus
rejects as absurd the idea of, say, Zaire being
given overnight 40 per cent of its imports and
exports in the liner trade to carry in its own ships.
But the idea of, say, Belgium being able to obtain
40 per cent of its imports and exports similarly-
not by any right as such but by negotiation on a
'hands off' basis with its EEC partnersseems
to have made perfect sense to them, in that
Belgium had or could quickly acquire the appro-
priate amount of tonnage; thus it was only 'fair'
that it be allowed and indeed encouraged to do
so. What price logical consistency here? In a
'fair' market, why should Belgium's maritime
aspirations have any greater justification than
Zaire's? And in a 'free' market, the aspirations
of either are surely irrelevant without the ability
to meet them. These and other fine points of
market-sharing have not yet received the clarifica-
tion they deserve from Western shipping
spokesmen.
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The reason that Western governments, dragging
Western shipowners reluctantly behind them,
have taken this great step towards withdrawing
a part of world shipping from the market is to
prevent its being totally withdrawn, along with
shipbuilding, air transport, steelmaking, textiles,
andit is mischievously addedalmost every-
thing else. The argument in Brussels, Tokyo
and Washington, was that many of the developing
countries would act unilaterally if they could
not get agreement multilaterally, and would pass
laws reserving not 40 per cent of their raw
material exports but 50 or 80 per cent. Even
though liner ships in fact carry precious few raw
materials, and the biggest raw material of them
allcrude oilhas not yet been subjected to
maritime mercantiism (despite its accounting
for two of every three tons carried by sea and
originating in only a handful of countries), these
considerations did not seem to influence the
course of the argument for the compromise
acceptance of the Liner Code.
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Will Bulk Trade Be Next?
There are major differences between the bulk and
liner trades, which explain the difference of
approach. Nightmares of permanent part cargoes
for every single ship, and permanent tallies by
flag being kept in each and every port, may well
now be keeping operations managers of liner
companies from their much deserved sleep, but
the liner trades are already closely monitored
and regulated in ways that the tramp trades are
not, if for practical reasons of commerce rather
than theoretical reasons of state. A tramp ship
can go where it will, but the liner goes where it
must. Organised into Conferences, liner ships ply
set routes by fairly strict timetables, and are
unable to stay in port for a few days on the off
chance of topping up with a bit more cargo.
Their freight rates, which are set in advance,
are common to all the other ships in the
Conference, and can be either more or less than
the rates they would get on any one day were they
operating on a tramp basis. In return for pro-
viding a regular service which the shippers want,
the shipowners build into these rates a reasonable
enough profit to compensate for those days of
part-cargo.
Apart from their inherent susceptibility to
bureaucratic supervision, the other appeal of
liners is that they account for roughly 50 per cent
of all freight rates, although only 20 per cent or
thereabouts of volume. There is a percentage,
therefore, in going for control on the part of
deprived developing countries. But it is a different
story with the bulk trades; virtually all tankers,
grain carriers, ore carriers and the like, as well
as general cargo ships not in the Conferences,
operate on the tramp principle. While the great
majority of them ply pretty regular routes and
are on charter for fixed customers, they are still
much freer than liners to go where the rates
are highest.
There is, in other words, a world of difference
in the supervisory potential of the liner and the
bulk trades. Yet with the compromise success of
the Liner Code, the expectation at Manila was
that the principles of cargo sharing could be
extended from the carriage of mostly manu-
factured goodswhere the Third World is a far
greater importer than exporterto that of raw
materials, where it is an infinitely greater exporter
than importer. The logic of extension applies well
enough on the theoretical plane but is less obvious
on the operational plane. This explains more
than anything else why so little headway was
made on the subject in Manila in May.
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The very general picture so far painted should
not be allowed to obscure some of the smaller
cameos. Many developing countries have achieved
carrying capacity in excess of the 40 per cent
minimum without the benefit of protectionist
international conventions, and a few of them
without even the leg-up of protectionist domestic
legislation. Also, a tiny handful of them have
larger fleets flying their flags than do most
Western countries, purely for the purpose of the
fee income of registration of the tonnage.
Liberia, Panama, Singapore and Cyprus are the
ones that spring to mind, and formerly Honduras;
these are widely referred to as the flags of
convenience. Then again, a few developing
countries earn substantial foreign exchange not
from operating or registering ships, but from
providing the crews. And a fourth group are
rapidly building up the capacity actually to make
ships, either for their own use or for inter-
national sale. Few of the oil producing countries
feature in any of these categories.
These cameos can be said to complicate the
general picture somewhat. A strict application
of the 40: 40: 20 principle as a maximum rather
than a minimum for cargo reservation in the
liner trades and, for the sake of argument, in
the bulk trades too, would in fact hit some
developing countries, and let many developed
countries go unscathed. And if the 40: 40: 20
principle covered not only the vessels but
the people aboard them, such countries as the
Philippines would be in genuine trouble, given
the number of fine seamen she exports. And if the
argument is lifted from the seagoing personnel
to the onshore personnel, the Pandora's box of
effective ship management under the new regime
is well and truly opened. It will no doubt be
remembered not only that Pandora got more than
she expected, but that she could not shut the box
again.
This whole international wrangle, with all its
ramifications of equity, participation and profit,
comes into sharp and sudden perspective when
the obvious is stated: developing countries are
not after the cargoes, they are after the ships.
Under a regime where big international carriers
such as the Norwegians, British, Greeks or Hong
Kong Chinese, rapidly run up against their quota
ceilings at their traditional ports of call and
officially have to go away empty, the only way
for such carriers to keep their ships working
would be for them to do a deal. For the coun-
tries turning the excess tonnage away have very
little tonnage of their own, and would like to
acquire some.
The key is the joint venture. A shipowner like
Sir Y.K. Pao, the world's biggest, has a fleet
approaching 200, more vessels than those
possessed by around 35 developing countries
together. Many South East Asian countries would
like to meet their carrying capacity entitlement
under 40: 40: 20, and often use his ships. So all
that need be done is to switch flags on the
required number for each country, give him 50
per cent of the holding company under eachjurisdiction and then carry on as before. To
suggest this is not to say that the World Wide
Shipping GroupSir Y.K. Pao's main company
is actively engaged in merger talks with nascent
shipping groups the length and breadth of the
Pacific; he has been singled out here only because
of the size of his fleet. What is intended is to
show the way things are probably going, and to
add the comment that they would not be, were it
not for the demands of cargo sharing as laid
down by the 1974 Liner Code of Conduct.
No shipping company will give up the right to
part of its assets if the market does not oblige it.
The Third World knows that the market will not
supply it with the ocean-going tonnage it wants,
and so it must get it by other means. But will it
benefit? As the most steady-nerved shipowner
and the most uneasy shipping banker will agree,
there is no causal relationship between having
title to a ship, however beautifully and recently
built, and getting profit out of it. Steady and
respectable profits are obtainable from prudent
ship management policies and careful marketing
services when supply and demand are roughly in
balance, though even in boom periods bad
management and marketing can lose money on
perfectly good ships and crew. But what is
perhaps not so widely realisedand what thereby
explains the element of emotion that enters the
protests of many Third World negotiators against
Western shipping in generalis that the big
profits, the real money that gives the tycoons
their airlines and luxury yachts, comes not rom
using ships, but from buying and selling them;
and how are developing countries to get into
that side of the business, should they want to?
It may be said in conclusion that on the long and
weary road to a fairer distribution of the world's
wealth, shipping is a useful milestone. The
painting of new emblems on funnels and the
hauling up of 100 new flags act as great
psychological boosts to developing countries' self-
confidence, and taken in that light are welcome
measures. But they will emerge as blessings more
than a little mixed if they are seen as being sound
economic initiatives in themselves. It cannot be
stated too often by those who knowby those
who have the ships and are one day to have to
part with themthat running ships is not as
easy as it looks. It has remained an independent
low average profit industry throughout the post-
war era while other forms of transport have
become relatively expensive and increasingly
subsidised. The main reason is that it has been
competitive in the truest sense of the word.
Bankruptcies have been common.
With ownership by Third World companies of a
growing proportion of the world fleet, the role
of the private sector is bound to decrease since
the majority of enterprise in most developing
countries is publicly owned and this will extend
to the 50 per cent holdings in the wave of joint
ventures that will flood the market as the
40: 40: 20 principle takes hold. There is no
inherent reason why a state-owned enterprise
should be less profitable than its privately-owned
counterpart; it is just that within economies and
between economies, this almost invariably seems
to be the case, and there is little to indicate that
the same will not also apply in world shipping.
Without the incentive of private profit, the urge
to cut costs to the bone quickly evaporates, and
the customers lose out. It is a paradox that will
stand the test of time that when the profit
element is driven out of world shipping at one
end, the low cost element will have been squeezed
out at the other. So developing countries which
desperately need to maximise the return on their
investment in raw material production and sales,
will see an erosion of profitability through higher
transportation costs. And if that is seen as a
summary tbo simplistic or too polemicalor
bothfor normal economic analysis, then the
only counter is: wait and see.
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